Case Law Addressing Parental Alienation Syndrome
Compiled by DV LEAP, 2009 1
Note: Cases with an asterisk are formally unpublished but obtainable as cited.
Rejecting:
Snyder v. Cedar, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 520 (2009)
The plaintiff Daniel Snyder and the defendant Deborah Cedar were married on January 26, 1985. Their daughter Aviva was born soon after on October 21, 1985. In July 1990, Cedar instituted divorce proceedings in response to a violent encounter with the plaintiff. The pair engaged in a hotly contested divorce, specifically on the issue of custody and visitation of their daughter. Ultimately, both parties agreed to joint custody of Aviva with the child’s primary residence to be with Cedar and bi-weekly visitation rights with Snyder. In the years following, Snyder’s relationship with his daughter declined, culminating with a verbal argument in April 1997. Soon after, a social worker at Aviva’s school voiced concern that Aviva had been sexually abused. However, it was not until the following year that Aviva herself alleged sexual abuse by her father. Snyder maintains that the sexual allegations originated not with Aviva, but with Cedar in her efforts to turn Aviva against her father. As evidence of his theory, Snyder presented the testimony of Aviva’s childhood psychotherapist, Dr. Diane Rotnem. Dr. Rotnem testified that Aviva suffered from parental alienation syndrome. Although the court ultimately found the allegations of sexual abuse against Snyder were without merit, it rejected Dr. Rotnam’s testimony on PAS. Specifically, the court found that PAS lacked “any scientific basis” and that the syndrome had not been the subject of credible scientific studies. The court also found that PAS “lacks any methodological underpinning,” and as such, is inadmissible because it is “incapable of helping the fact finder determine a fact in dispute.”
People v. Fortin, 706 N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000)
Defendant Michael Fortin was charged with various counts of sexual assault of his wife’s 13-year-old niece. At trial, Fortin sought to introduce expert testimony by Dr. Richard Gardner regarding parental alienation syndrome to support his claim that the child fabricated the allegations of sexual assault against him due to “interfamilial discord.” After a Frye hearing on the admissibility of evidence of PAS, the trial court rejected Dr. Gardner’s testimony on PAS, holding that it was not shown to be a theory generally accepted in the scientific community and thus inadmissible.
NK v. MK, 17 Misc.3d 1123(A); 2007 WL 3244980 (N.Y.Sup. 2007)
Former spouses each seek, inter alia, a disproportionate equitable distribution in a contested divorce based on allegations by each party of egregious conduct. The wife cites a long pattern of domestic violence on the part of the husband while the husband alleges the wife engaged in conduct resulting in the alienation of the child from him. The Supreme Court of New York ultimately refuses to grant the father economic relief and finds there is no “generally accepted diagnostic determination or syndrome known as ‘parental alienation syndrome.’” Furthermore, the court notes that courts “cannot just accept the opinion of an expert and must evaluate it and then determine its efficacy or application to the case before it…especially [in cases] where there are allegations of domestic violence which must be considered in the context of a custody dispute.”
1 This memorandum was compiled by Tarek Ghalayini, law student, while working as an intern for DV LEAP, under the supervision of Joan Meier, Director, DV LEAP.
2 This section represents only a sample of cases making mention of PAS and generally includes cases where a court’s findings or holdings related to PAS, if any, are echoed by cases listed elsewhere in this document.
Hanson v. Spolnik, 685 N.E.2d 71 (Ind.App. 1997)
The majority affirmed a trial court’s modification of custody order granting the father sole physical and legal custody of the couple’s daughter. The trial court based its decision in part on the testimony of Dr. Richard Lawlor, a child psychologist who testified that the mother’s “comments and allegations against [the father] were directed at alienating [the couple’s daughter] from [the father] and that [the mother’s] behavior endangered [the child’s] emotional and psychological development.” Although the trial court did not specifically use the term PAS, the testimony and analysis indicated that they heard evidence of PAS without examining it for admissibility. On appeal, the majority affirmed the trial court’s decision also without addressing the admissibility of PAS. They found that there was a change in circumstances based in part on the mother’s repeated allegations of sexual abuse by the father. However, in a footnote, the majority noted that allegations of sexual abuse will not always support a change of custody.
Dissent, Chezem, J.
In a scathing dissent of the majority’s mischaracterization of PAS, Judge Chezem rejects PAS as a theory and likens it to ““cult” theories like the “Peter Pan Syndrome” or the “Cinderella Complex”” that are “more suitable in a pop psychology venue rather than in a court of law.” He concludes that the majority erroneously permitted PAS evidence because of problems of causation, scientific reliability and admissibility as scientific evidence.
Addressing Without Ruling on Validity:
Palazzolo v. Mire, --- So.2d ----, 2009 WL 103957 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2009)
Ms. Mire and Ms. Palazzolo, a lesbian couple residing in California, had a child by artificial insemination after nearly 17 years together. Ms. Mire was the birth mother while Ms. Palazzolo was the adoptive mother. When the child was nearly five years old, the couple separated due, at least in part, to allegations that Ms. Mire engaged in lesbian affair while traveling for work. Due in part to special circumstances created by Hurricane Katrina, Ms. Mire enjoyed physical custody of the child for several months after the split. Ms. Palazzolo filed a petition for custody and visitation, alleging Ms. Mire denied her communication and access to the child. In her response, Ms. Mire alleged that she did so in part because Ms. Palazzolo refused to discontinue inappropriate conduct, including watching the child undress and bathe. In a court ordered custody evaluation, court-appointed evaluator Dr. Brian Jordan found that Ms. Palazzolo has “engaged in sex abuse of her adopted daughter.” The trial court thereafter granted the parent’s joint physical custody. A long custody battle ensued, with a series of psychologists examining the child her relationship with her parents. The trial court acknowledged the concept of PAS without examining it’s admissibility. The Court of Appeals discussed PAS at length in its opinion and acknowledged the confusion within legal and scientific circles as to whether or not PAS is a valid scientific theory. Ultimately, the court relied on testimony by the experts in the case to make it’s ruling, one of which who noted that “her recommendation was not based on PAS; rather, her recommendation was based on the unique facts of this case.” Therefore, despite discussing and defining the court’s understanding of what PAS is, the majority never reaches the issue of whether PAS is scientifically valid or if evidence of PAS is even admissible in court because the experts claimed they either did not subscribe to PAS or did not make their recommendations based on a finding of PAS.
*In re Marriage of Blake, 2007 WL 1154057 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2007).
In a divorce proceeding, the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff-father to introduce evidence of PAS in the children with respect to custody and visitation issues. While the Court of Appeals takes note of the dispute within the legal and scientific community regarding the validity of PAS, they do not directly examine its validity. Instead, the Court upholds the trial court’s ruling on procedural grounds (the father did not offer a qualified expert on PAS, only a reference to a law journal article in his trial brief).
*Ignatiuk v. Ignatiuk, 2006 WL 933490 (Ark.App. 2006)
Appellant Kimberly Ignatiuk appeals a judgment changing custody of her two daughters to their father, Appellee Michael Ignatiuk. The parties were divorced in 1999 at which time they agreed to joint legal custody of the children with appellant having primary physical custody. In 2001, the children began therapy to deal with alleged sexual abuse by father, among other things. The father was acquitted of criminal charges related to allegations of sexual abuse by one of the children. In 2002, and in response to motions by both parties regarding visitation, the trial court ordered psychological evaluations of the children by a court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Paul DeYoub. Other psychologists conducted several subsequent psychological evaluations as well.
After the appellant remarried and moved to Florida with her children, the appellee filed for a change in custody alleging appellant’s move to Florida frustrated his visitation rights. After denying appellant’s continuance, the court ordered a change in custody based in large part on the testimony of Dr. Lowitz, a court-appointed psychologist who recommended a change in custody and Dr. Dyer, a guardien ad litum appointed by the court who alleged PAS. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling without examining the admissibility of testimony on PAS.
*Linder v. Johnson, 2006 WL 3425021 (Ark.App. 2006)
11) Linder v. Johnson
When Jennifer Linder and Deron Johnson divorced, they were granted joint custody of their two children – then seven and five years old. Three years after the divorce, Johnson sought a change in custody, alleging that Linder had “systematically ‘poisoned’ the children’s minds” against him. Linder argued that the children feared visitation with Johnson because he physically abused them. Both children testified at the trial that their father physically abused them. But a court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Paul DeYoub, interviewed Linder, Johnson, and the children. During the interviews, the children—then twelve and fourteen—both “expressed fear for their lives and threatened to run away if [Johnson] was awarded custody.” Dr. DeYoub diagnosed the children with “Parental Alienation Syndrome,” explaining that Linder “made the children believe that [Johnson] had abused them, . . . systematically alienating the children from [Johnson].” DeYoub recommended that Johnson be granted sole custody. A therapist who had been seeing the children for two years recommended that Linder retain custody. The granted Johnson sole custody.
Ms. Linder refused to comply. The court found her in contempt and ordered her to serve a one-year sentence, a ruling she successfully challenged. She appealed the change of custody.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling based on Dr. DeYoub’s recommendation and PAS finding. The Court did not examine the admissibility of Dr. DeYoub’s testimony on PAS, but instead deferred to the trial court’s finding. Although the Court of Appeals examined testimony by the children and mother regarding abuse by the father to determine whether the mother alienated the children from their father, the Court of Appeals was “convinced that Dr. DeYoub's conclusions regarding the parties' behavior are consistent with the statements the parties gave to Dr. DeYoub and the testimony offered at the hearings.”
In re Marriage of Bates, 819 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. 2004)
When Norma and Edward Bates divorced, Norma was granted custody of their daughter, with visitation for Edward. Less than a year after the divorce, Norma sought modification of the arrangement, in part because the daughter was “experiencing extreme anxiety and distress following contact with her father.” She alleged that Edward abused alcohol while the daughter was in his care, and that he abused the daughter. Edward argued that Norma’s accusations of abuse were an intentional attempt to alienate the daughter from him.
Edward presented several expert witnesses, including Dr. Richard Gardner, who testified that the daughter suffered from Parental Alienation Syndrome. The court refused to find that the daughter had been abused, and instead followed the recommendation of Edward’s experts, granting sole custody of the daughter to Edward, though it purported to “throw out the words ‘parental alienation syndrome.’”
When Norma appealed the decision, arguing that PAS was not scientific and not reliable, the Illinois Supreme Court asserted that it did not need to decide whether PAS was an accepted scientific theory because the trial court did not rely on PAS in reaching its decision. Like the trial court, the supreme court accepted the premises of PAS while purporting to decide the case without reliance on the theory. The court explained that the trial court’s decision rested on the finding that Norma’s allegations of abuse “interfered with [the daughter’s] ability to build a ‘close and continuing relationship’ with her father.”
*In re Marriage of Arthur, 2004 WL 1732709 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2004).
In a high conflict divorce, the mother of two minor children appeals a final custody order granting the father primary physical custody (and both parents joint legal custody) of the children on the grounds that, inter alia, the trial court inappropriately permitted testimony on PAS. Without examining the admissibility of PAS, the Court of Appeals overlooked the mother’s claim because the trial court did not rest its ruling on a PAS theory.
Ruggiero v. Ruggiero, 819 A.2d 864 (Conn.App. 2003)
“The [trial] court made a factual finding that the plaintiff had engaged in parental alienation. The plaintiff's claim concerning parental alienation dealt with the issue of the validity of a finding of parental alienation syndrome. The court did not address any potential mental health condition. This opinion utilizes the court's factual conclusion that the plaintiff's activity as a parent alienated the defendant, and this court makes no decision concerning the validity of such a syndrome.”
*Faucher v. Bitzer, 2002 WL 432750 (Ark.App. 2002)
Appellant Denise Faucher and appellee Lon Bitzer divorced in 1995, and Ms. Faucher was awarded custody of the couple’s four children. During the next several years, the children’s relationship with Bitzer deteriorated. Three separate child abuse reports were filed with the state department of human services during this time, though the department determined them to be “unfounded.”Mr. Bitzer filed for a change of custody in 1999 alleging Ms. Faucher alienated the children from him. The court found his allegations credible and awarded full custody to Mr. Bitzer. On appeal, Ms. Faucher argued, among other things, that evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding that the strained relationship between the children and their father was a result of her actions.
The trial court based its ruling on the testimony of Dr. Paul DeYoub and Dr. Glenn Lowitz, both court-appointed psychologists. Both doctors recommended a change of custody to the father based on their finding that Ms. Faucher alienated the children from their father. The Court of Appeals found no evidence to suggest the trial court’s reliance on such testimony was improper, in part because the allegations of abuse against the father were “unfounded.”
J.F. v. L.F., 694 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 1999)
In this New York Family Court (not appellate) case, the court notes that while PAS is controversial, “generally the New York Courts, in the context of a custody/visitation case, rather than discussing the acceptability of PAS as a theory, have discussed the issue in terms of whether the child has been programmed to disfavor the noncustodial parent, thus warranting a change in custody.”
In re Marriage of Rosenfeld, 524 N.W.2d 212 (Iowa App. 1994)
“We do not pass upon the issue of whether parental alienation syndrome is a reliable theory. Rather, we look at the evidence induced and draw our own conclusion. Because this is a de novo review, we look only at the evidence we deem admissible.” From this, the court implies that while evidence of PAS may or may not be reliable, evidence of PAS is admissible.
Discussing unfavorably:
*Cichanowicz v. Cichanowicz, 2008 WL 4292724 (Ohio App. 3 Dist. 2008)
Father appealed a magistrate order naming his ex-wife and mother of their children the residential parent of the children. The Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld the magistrate’s finding that the expert testimony offered on PAS “was unreliable because [the expert] reached this conclusion without interviewing [the child].”
*In re J.C., 2007 WL 4239288 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2007)
While the issue on appeal in this case did not relate to PAS directly, the California Court of Appeals refers to the trial testimony of an expert who characterizes PAS as merely the father’s “externalization of responsibility for problems largely of his own making” rather than a problem with the child. Describing PAS as somewhat of a red herring, the therapist frames PAS as a way for the father in the case to refuse to accept “any responsibility for his daughter's estrangement from him” and instead incorrectly believe that “[the child] has become a troubled teen and her mother and stepfather have alienated her from him.”
C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 879 So.2d 1169 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003)
Appellant C.J.L. and appellee M.W.B. were married and had three minor children together. They divorced in 1999. The parties received joint custody of the children with primary physical custody to the mother-appellant. In post-trial motions concerning the mother’s allegations that the father abused their minor child, the trial court appointed Dr. Karl Kirkland, a psychologist, to perform a custody evaluation. Despite statements from all three children indicating their desire to no longer visit their father, Dr. Kirkland recommended the father be given sole physical custody based on his finding that the mother alienated the children from their father. The trial court granted a change in custody to the father based on Dr. Kirkland’s recommendation.
The mother appealed the trial court’s ruling in part because PAS is not generally accepted in the scientific community and as a result does not meet the Frye test for admissibility. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama held that Dr. Kirkland’s testimony on PAS is not subject to the Frye test because 1) he did not make an explicit diagnosis of PAS in the children and 2) the trial court did not explicitly rely on a finding of PAS in their ruling. The Appellate court went on to note however, that “if faced squarely with the question [of] whether evidence concerning an actual diagnosis of PAS was admissible under Frye's “general acceptance” test, [they would] be inclined to agree with the mother and find that PAS had not been generally accepted in the scientific community.”
*People v. Sullivan, 2003 WL 1785921 (Cal.App. 6 Dist. 2003)
Criminal action
Defendant Charles Sullivan was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of forcible lewd or lascivious acts on a child, acts he committed against his two minor daughters after divorcing their mother. Defendant appealed the conviction, in part on the grounds that the trial court erred in excluding testimony by Dr. Randy Rand on parental alienation syndrome. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction in part, finding that the trial court appropriately excluded Dr. Rand’s testimony because “(1) the behavior was not beyond common experience within the meaning of [California Rule of Evidence] section 801, subdivision (a); (2) the testimony was not scientific enough to satisfy the “Kelly-Frye” rule; and (3) Dr. Rand's name was not included on the witness list.” Without examining PAS directly, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court was within its discretion to exclude the evidence and find that “[e]xpert opinion is not admissible if it consists of inferences and conclusions which can be drawn as easily and intelligently by the trier of fact as by the witness.”
Overlooking PAS on Procedural Grounds:
*In re Marriage of Alvarez, 2007 WL 1057029 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2007)
A mother (Kim Alvarez) appeals a child custody order restricting her to supervised visitation because the trial court erred in admitting the testimony on PAS by therapist John Parker. The California Court of Appeals did not reach the admissibility of testimony on PAS and instead found that the therapist “did not offer any opinions about PAS and therefore the statements were not inadmissible on this basis.”
Hughes v. Hughes, 588 N.W.2d 346 (Wis.App. 1998)
Mother appeals a trial court order modifying physical placement of her child and awarding physical placement with her ex-husband because the trial relied on expert testimony of PAS which, she argues, is inadmissible because it is scientifically invalid. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin does not examine the scientific validity of PAS because they find that “there is other evidence in the record that supports the trial court's findings.”
Costley v. Benjamin, 2005 WL 1950114 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2005) (Not Reported in S.W.3d)
“We need not determine whether Parental Alienation Syndrome is recognized by the psychological community or establishes a reliable basis for expert testimony” because the trial court did not rely on evidence of PAS.
*In re Marriage of Idelle C., Ovando C., 2002 WL 1764181 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 2002)
Same as Costley.
Coleman v. Coleman, 2004 WL 1966083 (Conn.Super. 2004)
“This court need not reach the question of the reliability of the claims of the theoreticians espousing the parental alienation syndrome. Whether it is legitimate or not is not a determination necessary for a proper determination of the custodial orders in this case.”
In re T.T., 681 N.W.2d 779 (N.D. 2004)
The Supreme Court of North Dakota precluded a mother’s argument on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding PAS because it is not a recognized scientific term in the scientific community where the mother did not make the same objection in the trial court.
Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 816 So.2d 210 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 2002)
Appellant father contends that the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding PAS because the testimony did not meet the Frye standard. The District Court of Appeal of Florida refused to consider appellant’s argument because appellant did not make the same objection at trial.
*In re Spencley, 2000 WL 33519710 (Mich.App. 2000)
The Court of Appeals of Michigan rejects appellants arguments that the trial court erred in relying on psychologist’s testimony regarding PAS because “the psychologist's use of this theory at trial was merely a way to explain appellant's behavior” and furthermore that ”appellant did not challenge the admission of the evidence concerning “parental alienation syndrome” at trial” and is therefore precluded from doing so on appeal.
*Williams v. Transcender, 1998 WL 204949 (Wash.App. Div. 1 1998)
In a one-page opinion, the Court of Appeals of Washington declines review of the validity of PAS because the respondent “cited no legal authority in support of his arguments.”
*Bowles v. Bowles, 1997 WL 639491 (Conn.Super. 1997)
The Superior Court of Connecticut dismisses as unnecessary an examination of whether or not PAS is a reliable theory because “[w]hether [PAS] is legitimate or not is not a determination necessary for a proper determination of the custodial orders in this case.”
People v. Loomis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 1997)
Criminal Case
In this criminal case, the court rejected a father’s evidence of PAS to show sexual abuse did not occur because “New York practice does not allow experts to offer an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact as to whether sexual abuse has occurred.”
Additional Cases Making Mention of PAS 2 :
Ellis v. Ellis, 952 So.2d 982 (Miss.App. 2006) – Allowing expert testimony of PAS without ruling on its admissibility or validity as a scientific theory.
In re Marriage of Kimbrell, 119 P.3d 684 (Kan.App. 2005) – In this case, Dr. Gardner finds the children DO NOT suffer from PAS and that the mother is not engaging in alienating activity.
Martin v. Martin, 120 Nev. 342 (Nev. 2004) – The Supreme Court of Nevada notes that “interference by a custodial parent with a noncustodial parent's visitation privileges does not necessarily give rise to parental alienation syndrome.”
*In re Marriage of McCord, 2003 WL 23219961 (Iowa App. 2003) – “We have not passed upon the issue of whether parental-alienation syndrome is a reliable theory. We find it unnecessary to do so now. Rather, we look at the evidence introduced and draw our own conclusion.”
*Finster v. Finster, 2003 WL 22005755 (Wis.App. 2003) – “Consistent with the court's broad discretion in child support matters, the court may consider placement issues, but here, the trial court did not explain its reasons for relying on parental alienation syndrome as a reason for denying modification of support. We therefore remand for the court to articulate its decision.”
State v. Fuller, 160 N.C.App. 250 (N.C.App. 2003) – Allowing expert testimony of PAS without ruling on its admissibility or validity as a scientific theory.
White v. Kimrey, 847 So.2d 157 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2003) – same
*In re S.G., 2003 WL 125122 (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 2003) – same
Wiederholt v. Fischer, 485 N.W.2d 442 (Wisc. 1992)
Appellant Wiederholt filed a motion seeking primary physical custody of the children based on allegations that the children suffered from parental alienation syndrome caused by the respondent’s actions. The trial court denied his motion without directly addressing the validity of evidence of PAS. The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin upheld the trial court’s ruling also without addressing the admissibility of PAS and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In Interest of T.M.W., 553 So.2d 260 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1989)
In an appeal seeking review of a court order compelling a minor child to submit to a psychological evaluation, the court refuses to address the admissibility of PAS. The court does note, however, that “[n]o determination was made [at the trial court level] in the order or on the record as to general professional acceptance of the “parental alienation syndrome” as a diagnostic tool.”
*Chambers v. Chambers, 2000 WL 795278 (Ark.App. 2000) – allowing PAS testimony by Dr. Warren Sieler, who claims to have coined the term ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome.’